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Samuel F lei sc h acker: A Third Concept of Liberty: judgment and Freedom in Kant 
and Adam Smith. Princeton: Princeron University Press 1999. xiv+336 pages. 
Fleischacker sets his rich and provocative comparative study of Kant and Smith in 
the conceptual framework provided by Isaiah Berlin's well-known distinction be-
tween negative and positive concepts of liberty. There are three distinguishable 
strands of argument and interpretation that he weaves together in order ro articu-
late and defend the work's main philosophical claim: "that there is a real third 
possibility in between the notions of negative and positive liberty, combing the most 
attractive features of both" (p. 8). This philosophical claim then serves as the basis 
for an exposition of a contemporary reconstruction of "an old but little discussed 
tradition of liberalism" whose origin Fleischacker locates "in the series of thinkers, 
from Friedrich Schmer to Wilhelm von Humboldt in the eighteenth century, to Han-
nah Arendt in our own day, who have been inspired by Kant's Critique of judg-
ment" (p. x). This "thiid concept of liberty focuses on the important human skill 
known as ' judgment,' and it construes human freedom above all as that which 
enables one ro judge for oneself- unlike a child, who requires others to judge for 
her, who requires tutelage" (p. 4). 
The first argumentative strand, developed in three chapters, focuses upon Kant's 
notion of aesthetic judgment. Chapter 2 analyzes Kant's construa l of aesthetic judg-
ment in terms of "the harmony of the faculties." He reads this harmony in terms of 
an interplay between the particularizing and the generalizing tendencies of " reflec-
tiv~ judgment." Fleischacker devotes the next two two chapters, respectively, ro 
spelling out the implications this has for moral judgment (Chapter 3) and to pro-
posing an account of the relationship between the freedom of judgment and the 
freedom of reason (Chapter 4 ). In the couiSe of these chapters, Fleischacker enters 
his reading of Kant into conversation with Aiistotle's notion of practical wisdom 
· and Smith's account of moral judgment as found in the Theory of the Moral Sen-
timents. The crucial claim that emerges from this first strand of argument is that 
the capacity for judgment is central ro the individuality of persons; on this basis, 
Fleischacker will then proceed to argue, the "liberty" to which liberal political 
arrangements must give favor is first and foremost the freedom of judgment. These 
arrangements, moreover, must trod "a delicate line ... between structuring society 
so little that it fails to provide the conditions for judgment and structuring it so 
much that it paternally squelches judgment itself" (p. 87). 
The second strand of argument develops from an analysis of Smith's account of 
politica l economy, for which Fleischacker uses the Wealth of Nations as the focal 
text. The three chapters devoted to a c;:lose reading of this text are preceded by one 
on "Proper Pleasures. " This discussion functions to counter typical modern utilitar-
ian "value-free" definitions of pleasure by defending the earlier view that there are 
better and worse kinds of pleasuie. Fleischacker constructs this defense by using Ar-
istotle and Mill as conceptual resources for "building into pleasure a role for 
phronesis or judgment" (p. 91). Specifically, he delimits as a "proper pleasure" one 
that "comes with the successful carrying out of [a specific] activity and that ... en-
hances our ability to carry out that activity in the future" (p. 92). These pleasures 
accrue to the wide array of small tasks that constitute much of everyday life- and it 
is the successful completion of these tasks that, in Fleischacker's view, serves both as 
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the training ground for judgment and the locus for an individually textured sense of 
life meaning. Fleischacker then goes on to claim that the difference between this 
kind of pleasure and those he terms "biological pleasures" and "distracting pleas-
ures" has signiiicanr consequences for the life of a liberal polity in that it consider-
ably widens and diversifies the range of activities in which freedom of judgment can 
be cultivated and exercised. 
This stands as an appropriate prelude to his treatment of The Wealth of Nations 
in Chapters 6-8 inasmuch as Fleischacker believes that "better than a,nyone else ... 
Adam Smith has described the politics that the freedom of judgment requires" 
(p. 120). He disputes the standard interpretations that see efficiency as the control-
ling concept for Smith's advocacy of a politics that would leave people alone in 
matters .of economic choice. Instead, he proposes a reading that brings Smith's nor-
mative moral concerns to the fore, concerns that, on Fleischacker's reading, are 
aligned with an Aristotelian construal of phronesis but put to use in a way that de-
parts from Aristotle by being non-teleological and egalitarian. By placing a close 
analysis of Smith's use of the terminology of judgment in the context of his affinities 
and differences with Hume and Hutcheson, Fleischacker reaches a conclusion that 
recasts the role that Smith has frequently taken to give self-interest: "What concerns 
Smith is how to get interest to motivate good rather than bad judgment. But if so, 
'judgment' is exactly as important a theme in [the The Wealth of Nations] as self-
interest has been taken to be." (p. 138) The treatment of the Wealth of Nations then 
proceeds to a discussion of the role of played by notions of virtue and independence 
(Chapter 7) and egalitarianism (Chapter 8). In each case, Fleischacker gives an ac-
count that gently but firmly dismantles an image of Smith as patron of an unbridled 
laissez-fa ire market place for a corporate capitalism energized by a dynamic of self-
interest that would be difficult to distinguish from pure selfishness. Thus, Fleisch-
ackers's analysis of the well known passage in which Smith observes that it "is not 
from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our 
diner, but from their regard to their own interest" (Wealth of Nations I.ii.2) con-
cludes that "instead of giving us an almost Ayn Randian paean to self-love, we may 
now see this famous passage as focusing on our capacity to be other-directed" 
(p. 155). Similarly, he takes Smith's understanding of "wealth" to be other than 
merely a quantitative measure of commodities- with the results that (1) a Smithian 
political economy has as much a moral as an economic goal: " ... to enable each per-
son in a society, as far as this is possible, to attain independence" (p. 182) and (2) "a 
society is not wealthy, no matter how much it produces, if its poorest people are 
badly off" (p. 164). Even as he agrees with part of the standard view that Smith ad-
vocates a laissez-faire economics - viz., that governments do no.t intervene in the 
workings of markets in order to redistribute wealth- he does not take this to imply 
that Smith is "laissez-faire about the institutions enabling [people] to develop judg-
ment in the first place" (p. 120). Fleischacker argues that Smith's views suggest, in-
stead that "insofar as necessary ... governments should insure that people are 
equally provided with the conditions for independence" (p. 182). 
Utilizing the resources developed in his re-reading of Kant and Smith, Fleisch-
acker then deploys, in Chapters 9 throughl l, the third main strand his of argument. 
This consists in linking Kant and Smith into a liberalism for contemporary politics 
that is offered as an alternative to the Rawlsian and the Habermasian reconstruc-
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tions of Kant that have domin_ated much recent discussion. At the outset, he articu-
lates two main ways in which this version of Kantian politics will differ in its con-
crete outcomes from the other two: " ( 1) in general, it will be more concerned with 
insuring that ordinary citizens can make their own daily decisions than with what 
principles guide society as a whole, and (2) specifically, it will favor market econ-
omics over centrally organized ones for moral rather than merely pragmatic rea-
sons." (p. 184) The larger ~onceprual crux that leads to these differences, however, 
lies in whether one reads Kant's politics as first and foremost a politics of judgment, 
as Fleiscbacker does, or as a politics of reason, which he takes as the reading that 
underlies both Rawls and Habermas. The problem that Fleischacker sees with the 
latter reading is that "it attempts too much to settle the question of what counts as, 
respectively, a fair society [Rawls] and a fair conversation (Habermas] in advance 
of the actual histories in which actual societies and conversations find themselves 
situated" (p. 210). In terms of the analysis of judgment proposed in the first argu-
mentative strand, "reason cannot get a grip on such [political] specifics except by 
means of judgment" (p. 194). Hence, a politics of reason runs the risk of emptiness 
because "the structure of reason cannot tell us anything, by itself, about its own 
concrete application to concrete matters of public policy" (p. 184). To the extent 
that "Kant ... recognized that there is no way to avoid the particularity of real judg-
ments" (p. 210) his politics, so Fleischacker claims, is thus best read as a politics of 
judgment that aims "to make the world free for good judgment" (p. 243). While 
this is a doctrine that may seem "quiet" and "unexciting," Fleischacker also be-
lieves it ro be "the most sensible, most decent, and the same time richest concept of 
liberty we can possibly find" (ibid.) . 
This skeletal account of the movement of Fleischacker's arguments cannot do jus-
tice to the full range of issues and texts that he engages in each strand- for instance 
his judicious assessment of some of the issues involved in the debates between com-
inunitarianism and individualism, his arguments for finessing the need for articulat-
ing a comprehensive concept of the good life, or his analysis of the bearing of talent, 
industry and luck on an egalitarianism founded on Kantian principles. This skeletal 
account also does not capture the extent to which this work is, in a quite positive 
sense, provocative- no matter how much one may agree or disagree either with the 
main thrust of its arguments or with the particulars marshaled in their support, one 
· needs to do so with the same qualjty of careful thoughtfulness the author has 
brought to bear in constructing them. Flcischacker is well aware that there are sig-
nificant issues at stake in the "battle over Kant's mantle" (p. 213) in which different 
forms of Kantian liberalism - including the one he presents- contend. One of the 
strengths of the interpretation he advQcates in this work is that, by reading Kant 
through a Smithian optic, it brings into clearer focus the empirically concrete el-
ements within which Kant frames his account of human society and its politics. One 
may, of course, legitimately dispute Fleischacker's assessment of the role those 
elements can and should appropriately play in contemporary appropriations of 
Kant's politics - but, intriguingly, it would seem that the resolution of that kind of 
dispute will itself have to involve the exercise of judgment. 
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